

CONFIDENTIAL

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22 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

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FROM :   
Chief, Classification Review Division

SUBJECT: Meeting with Mr. Alan Thompson, Chief  
of Declassification Division, NARS on 15 May 1980

1. The meeting was requested by Mr. Thompson. He had three points to discuss, namely: 1) a confusing requirement to protect names in the 198 feet of OSS records recently accessioned to NARS; 2) release of the Himmler Papers; and 3) a document containing the name of an OSS officer for which the British have requested classification review. (U)

2. Restriction on names appearing in OSS records accessioned to NARS. The problem for NARS is that the restrictions on release of names placed on NARS covering the 198 feet of OSS records accessioned to them are not only contradictory, but also defined so broadly as to be overly restrictive. The GSA Form 258 which governs the transfer of these records, in citing the restrictions under the Privacy Act, references our registration in the Federal Register (Volume 42, No. 184, 22 September 1977) which defines the DO Records System. That entry describes the categories of individuals covered by the system as: "Individuals who are of foreign intelligence or foreign counterintelligence interest to the CIA, either because of their actual, apparent, or potential association with foreign intelligence or foreign counterintelligence activities, or because they are of actual or potential use to CIA." NARS interprets this literally to mean that no names can be released since any and every name in the record would be of interest to us. In addition, this statement is contradicted by an accompanying one contained in an attachment to the Form 258 which indicates that "the affiliation of U.S. Persons with OSS may not be released..." (emphasis mine). Alan Thompson feels that this is not what we actually intended. He wondered if perhaps the persons responsible for the accessioning procedure were not the same persons who handled and reviewed the records and thus were not aware in detail of exactly what was in the records. Mr. Thompson was told that the office handling the accessioning was different from that doing the classification review; therefore, this office which was not involved in the accessioning process, could not comment directly on wording in or policy regarding the accessioning process. What we could and did enlighten Mr. Thompson on was the classification review procedure and what it was intended to achieve. We told him that that review we sought to protect: 1) all intelligence sources; 2) liaison services and our relationships with them; 3) staff personnel who served under non-official cover, but generally staffers under official cover were not protected; 4) in some instances intelligence methods, particularly in the technical field; 5) some information that could impact

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adversely on U.S. foreign relations, particularly that concerning [redacted] and 6) details of technical devices which could be useful to terrorists. This type of information was withheld on national security grounds under E.O. 12065. It was also pointed out that our classification reviewers had tabbed certain materials to bring to the attention of the NARS people. This included foreign liaison-related documents devoid of CIA protectable interests but containing foreign liaison interests that had to be considered before release. The foreign liaison nature of many documents is not obvious from their appearance but the OSS Review Team can spot them because of their intelligence backgrounds and experience in reviewing OSS material. Mr. Thompson said that they accept any tabbed document for what we say it is (the tab indicated "British interest," "French interest," etc.) and they will review its classification status using any guidelines they have from the country involved or will arrange for coordination with the country if necessary. The other type of material tabbed for NARS concerns documents from other U.S. Government agencies. This has been done largely as a convenience to NARS and is appreciated in that light. Mr. Thompson was told that the CRD position was that, barring human error or oversight, the 198 feet of OSS records contained no information CIA wanted to protect on national security grounds. It was pointed out that CRD is not really competent to comment on protection of names under the Privacy Act. Mr. Thompson was told that a conference had taken place between Col. Tagge of NARS and DDO/IMS people, that the DO had agreed to rewrite their restriction on release of names, and that the DO had been in touch with CRD to coordinate their effort with CRD and particularly with the OSS Review Team. Apparently Mr. Thompson was unaware that this had taken place and he seemed relieved to hear this. He is hoping for a quick response because this decision and definition will affect the manner in which NARS processes the OSS material. (C)

3. The Himmler Papers. NARS has one remaining group of records which were captured from the Nazis, a file of counterintelligence information known as the Himmler Papers, which is to be microfilmed and the originals sent to West Germany. Alan Thompson's Declassification Division has reviewed this material and turned up 4,600 documents with the names of foreign agents, i.e. foreign to the Nazi Germans, which they do not know what to do with. NARS ignores the classification given the documents by the Nazis but the names and identities of several agents uncovered by the Nazis, NARS feels, could be sensitive, particularly U.S. agents, or the agents working for U.S. allies, particularly the British, during WWII. NARS has gone as far as they can and they believe some greater expertise must be brought to bear. They feel that the Agency is the best place to find that expertise. All these documents are in German, of course, and we assured Mr. Thompson that we could provide an expert from the OSS Review Team who reads German and who could make the review. Mr. Thompson mentioned that there is some urgency in this matter because NARS wants to microfilm these documents, send these back to the Germans and finish the Nazi records project. Of course, anything we believe should be protected would be withheld. (U)

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SF Form 258

D. SPECIFIC RESTRICTIONS TO BE IMPOSED

Foreign Government Information must be afforded protection and will not be released without the prior approval of the government involved.

In keeping with the provisions of the Privacy Act information concerning the affiliation of U.S. persons with OSS may not be released without the consent of the person involved.

NOTE: This offering consists of CIA predecessor originated records (OSS, SSU, CIG) declassified under Agency authority - HQ  dated 14 May 1979. Some Security Classified records originated by other agencies are interspersed throughout the files.

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